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8 Abstract. The paper outlines a new interpretation of informational privacy and of its moral value. The main
9 theses defended are: (a) informational privacy is a function of the ontological friction in the infosphere, that is,
10 of the forces that oppose the information ﬂow within the space of information; (b) digital ICTs (information
11 and communication technologies) aﬀect the ontological friction by changing the nature of the infosphere (re-
12 ontologization); (c) digital ICTs can therefore both decrease and protect informational privacy but, most
13 importantly, they can also alter its nature and hence our understanding and appreciation of it; (d) a change in
14 our ontological perspective, brought about by digital ICTs, suggests considering each person as being consti-
15 tuted by his or her information and hence regarding a breach of one’s informational privacy as a form of
16 aggression towards one’s personal identity.
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1920 Introduction
21 ‘‘‘One of these days d’you think you’ll be able to see
22 things at the end of the telephone?’ Peggy said, get-
23 ting up.’’ She will not return to her wondering again,
24 in the remaining pages of Virginia Woolf ’s The
25 Years. The novel was published in 1937. Only a year
26 earlier, the BBC had launched the world’s ﬁrst public
27 television service in London, and Alan Turing had
28 published his groundbreaking work on Turing
29 Machines (Turing, 1936).
30 Distracted by a technology that invites practical
31 usage more readily than critical reﬂection, Peggy only
32 half-perceives that new ICTs (information and com-
33 munication technologies) are transforming society
34 profoundly and irrevocably. The thirties were laying
35 the foundations of the information society. It was
36 diﬃcult to make complete sense of such a signiﬁcant
37 change in human history, at this early stage of its
38 development. Nevertheless, an evocative phrase con-
39 cerning the topic of this article appears in an essay on
40 Montaigne, again by Virginia Woolf (The Common
41 Reader, 1925): ‘‘[we], who have a private life and hold
42 it inﬁnitely the dearest of our possessions [...]’’, will
43 ﬁnd protecting it ever more diﬃcult in a social envi-
44 ronment increasingly dependent on Peggy’s futuristic
45 technology.
46 Today, the commodiﬁcation of ICTs, begun in the
47 seventies, and the consequent spread of a global
48information society since the eighties, are progres-
49sively challenging the right to informational privacy,
50at least as westerners still conceived it in Virginia
51Woolf’s times. The problem is pressing.1 It has
52prompted a stream of scholarly and scientiﬁc inves-
53tigations, witness this special issue of Ethics and
54Information Technology; and there has been no
55shortage of political decisions and legally enforceable
56measures to tackle it.2 The goal of this paper, how-
57ever, is not to review the very extensive body of lit-
58erature dedicated to informational privacy and its
59legal protection, even in the relatively limited area of
60computer ethics studies. Rather, it is to argue in
61favour of a new ontological interpretation of infor-
62mational privacy and of its moral value, on the basis
63of the conceptual frame provided by Information
64Ethics (Floridi, 1999; forthcoming-a).
65Informational privacy and computer ethics
66Why have digital ICTs made informational privacy
67one of the most obvious and pressing issues in com-
68puter ethics? The question is crucial3 and deceptively
69simple.
1 Especially in the US, see Garﬁnkel (2000).
2 Froomkin (2000) still provides a valuable review.
3 See for example Johnson (2001), Bynum and Rogerson (2004)
and Tavani (2003).
Ethics and Information Technology (2006) 00:1–16  Springer 2006
DOI 10.1007/s10676-006-0001-7
Journal : ETIN Dispatch : 2-2-2006 Pages : 16
CMS No. : DO00026817
h LE h TYPESET
MS Code : ETIN0001 h CP h DISK4 4
A
U
T
H
O
R
’S
P
R
O
O
F
!
PDF-OUTPUT
U
N
CO
R
R
EC
TE
D
PR
O
O
F
70 According to one of the most widely accepted
71 explanations, digital ICTs exacerbate old problems
72 concerning informational privacy because of the
73 dramatic increase in their data Processing capacities,
74 in the speed (or Pace) at which they can process data,
75 and in the Quantity and Quality of data that they can
76 collect, record and manage. This can be referred to as
77 the 2P2Q hypothesis.
78 The trouble with any approach sharing the 2P2Q
79 hypothesis is that it concentrates only on obvious and
80 yet secondary eﬀects of the digital revolution, and
81 that it does so from a ‘‘continuist’’ philosophy of
82 technology (more on this in section four). It thus fails
83 to account for the equally important fact that digital
84 ICTs are also responsible both for a potential increase
85 in some kinds of informational privacy and, above
86 all, for a radical change in its overall nature. ICTs are
87 more redrawing rather than erasing the boundaries of
88 informational privacy. A few examples may help to
89 illustrate the point. Consider
90 • the ‘‘remotization’’ of information management,
91 such as the ordinary phenomenon of booking,
92 banking or shopping online;
93 • the growth of anonymous, indirect or non-
94 personal interactions. According to a recent survey
95 by Freever (a mobile-services ﬁrm, http://www.
96 freever.com) 45% of Britons had lied about their
97 location by text message; this is privacy as well;
98 • the much faster and more widespread revisability,
99 volatility and fragility of digital data. Personal
100 records can be upgraded or erased at the stroke of a
101 key, destroyed by viruses in a matter of seconds, or
102 become virtually unavailable with every change in
103 technological standards, whereas we are still able to
104 reconstruct whole family trees thanks to parish
105 documents that have survived for centuries; or
106 • the various technologies that enable users to
107 encrypt, ﬁrewall or protect information (e.g. with
108 passwords or PIN). In each case, it seems that
109 digital ICTs allow both the erosion of informa-
110 tional privacy and its protection. The following,
111 colourful episode is indicative: ‘‘Hong Kong busi-
112 nessmen, for example, once did not dare to leave
113 their mobile phones switched on while visiting
114 sleazy Macau, because the change in ringing tone
115 could betray them. After the ringing tone for
116 Macau was changed to sound like Hong Kong’s,
117 however, they could safely leave their phones on,
118 and roaming revenues soared.’’ (The Economist,
119 December 2nd 2004). 2P2Q explains only half of
120 the story.
121 The new challenges posed by digital ICTs are not
122 only a matter of ‘‘more of the same’’. They have their
123 roots in a radical and unprecedented transformation
124in the very nature (ontology) of the informational
125environment, of the informational agents4 embedded
126in it and of their interactions. As will be argued in this
127article, understanding this ontological transformation
128provides a better explanation that is not only con-
129sistent with the 2P2Q hypothesis – now to be inter-
130preted as a mere secondary eﬀect of a far more
131fundamental change – but also closer to the kernel of
132the privacy problem in the information society.
133Informational privacy as a function of ontological
134friction
135Imagine a model of a limited (region of the) info-
136sphere, represented by four students (our set of
137interactive, informational agents) living in the same
138house (our limited environment). Intuitively, given a
139certain amount of available information (which can
140be treated as a constant and hence disregarded), the
141larger the informational gap among the agents, the
142less they know about each other, the more private
143their lives can be.
144The informational gap is a function of the degree
145of accessibility of personal data. In our example,
146there will be more or less informational privacy
147depending on whether the students are allowed, e.g.,
148to have their own rooms and lock their doors. Other
149relevant conditions are easily imaginable (individual
150fridges, telephone lines in each room, separate
151entrances, etc.).
152Accessibility, in its turn, is an epistemic factor that
153depends on the ontological features of the infosphere,
154i.e. on the nature of the speciﬁc agents, of the speciﬁc
155environment in which they are embedded and of the
156speciﬁc interactions implementable in that environ-
157ment by those agents. If the walls in the house are few
158and thin and all the students have excellent hearing,
159the degree of accessibility is increased, the informa-
160tional gap is reduced and informational privacy is
161more diﬃcult to obtain and protect. The love life of
162the students may be badly aﬀected by the Japanese-
163style house they have chosen to share.
164The ontological features of the infosphere deter-
165mine a speciﬁc degree of ‘‘ontological friction’’ reg-
166ulating the information ﬂow within the system.
167‘‘Ontological friction’’ refers here to the forces that
168oppose the information ﬂow within (a region of) the
169infosphere, and hence (as a coeﬃcient) to the amount
170of work required for a certain kind of agent to obtain
171information (also, but not only) about other agents
172in a given environment, e.g. by establishing and
4 For a precise deﬁnition of agent see Floridi and Sanders
(2004b).
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173 maintaining channels of communication and by
174 overcoming obstacles in the ﬂow of information such
175 as distance, noise, lack of resources (especially time
176 and memory), amount and complexity of the data to
177 be processed etc.
178 Of course, the informational aﬀordances and
179 constraints provided by an environment are such only
180 in relation to agents with speciﬁc informational
181 capacities. In our model, brick walls provide much
182 higher ‘‘ontological friction’’ for the ﬂow of acoustic
183 information than a paper-thin partition, but this is
184 irrelevant if the students are deaf. More realistically,
185 the debate on privacy issues in connection with the
186 design of oﬃce spaces (from private oﬃces to panel-
187 based open plan oﬃce systems, to completely open
188 working environments, see Becker and Sims (2000))
189 oﬀers a signiﬁcant example of the relevance of vary-
190 ing degrees of ontological friction in social contexts.
191 We are now ready to formulate a qualitative sort
192 of equation, which will be needed to analyze the
193 relation between digital ICTs and informational pri-
194 vacy. Given a certain amount of personal informa-
195 tion available in (a region of) the infosphere I, the
196 lower the ontological friction in I, the higher the
197 accessibility of personal information about the agents
198 embedded in I, the smaller the informational gap
199 among them, and the lower the level of informational
200 privacy implementable about each of them. Put sim-
201 ply, informational privacy is a function of the onto-
202 logical friction in the infosphere. It follows that any
203 factor aﬀecting the latter will also aﬀect the former.
204 The factors in question can vary and may concern
205 more or less temporary or reversible changes in the
206 environment (imagine three of our students living in a
207 tent during a holiday, while the fourth is left home
208 alone) or in the agents (e.g., two of our students
209 change their behaviour because the other two have
210 quarrelled).
211 Because of their ‘‘data superconductivity’’, ICTs
212 are well-known for being among the most inﬂuential
213 factors that aﬀect the ontological friction in the inf-
214 osphere.5 A crucial diﬀerence between old and new
215 ICTs is how they aﬀect it.
216 Ontological friction and the diﬀerence between old
217 and new ICTs
218 In the past, ICTs have always tended to reduce what
219 agents considered the normal degree of ontological
220 friction in their environment. This already held true
221for the invention of the alphabet or the diﬀusion of
222printing. Photography and the rise of the daily press
223were no exceptions. One can easily sympathize with
224nineteenth century concerns about the impact on
225individuals’ informational privacy of ‘‘[r]ecent
226inventions and business methods [...], [i]nstantaneous
227photographs and newspaper enterprise [...]
228and numerous mechanical devices’’ (Warren and
229Brandeis, 1890).
230All this does not mean that, throughout history,
231informational privacy has constantly decreased in
232relation to the invention and spreading of ever more
233powerful ICTs. This would be a simplistic and mis-
234taken inference. As emphasized above, changes in the
235nature both of the environment and of the agents
236play a pivotal role as well, so the actual ontological
237friction, and hence the corresponding degree of
238informational privacy in a region of the infosphere,
239are the result of a ﬁne balance among several factors.
240Most notably, during the nineteenth and the twenti-
241eth centuries, following the industrial revolution, the
242social phenomenon of the new metropolis counter-
243acted the eﬀects of the latest ICTs, as urban envi-
244ronments fostered a type of informational privacy
245based on anonymity.6 This is the sort of privacy
246enjoyed by a leaf in the forest, still inconceivable
247nowadays in rural settings or small villages. In the
248same period in which Warren and Brandeis were
249working on their classic article, the Edinburgh of Dr.
250Jekyll7 and the London of Sherlock Holmes8 already
251provided increasing opportunities for informational
252privacy through anonymity, despite the recent avail-
253ability of new technologies.
254Old ICTs have always tended to reduce the onto-
255logical friction in the infosphere because they enhance
256or augment the agents embedded in it. To understand
257why, consider the appliances available in our stu-
258dents’ house.
259Some appliances – e.g. a drill, a vacuum cleaner or
260a food mixer – are tools that enhance their users,
261exactly like an artiﬁcial limb. Tele-ICTs (e.g. the
262telescope, the telegraph, the radio, the telephone or
263the television) are enhancing in this sense. Some other
264appliances – e.g. a dishwasher, a washing machine or
265a refrigerator – are robots that augment their users
266insofar as well-speciﬁed tasks can be delegated to
267them, at least partially. Recording ICTs (e.g. the
268alphabet and the various writing and printing
5 For a similar point see Moor (1997), who writes ‘‘When
information is computerized, it is greased to slide easily and quickly
to many ports of call’’ (p. 27).
6 Anonymity is deﬁned here as the unavailability of personal
information, or the ‘‘noncoordinability of traits in a given respect’’,
according to Wallace (1999).
7 Stevenson’s The Strange Case of Dr Jekyll and Mr Hyde was
ﬁrst published in 1886.
8 Doyle’s A Study in Scarlet was ﬁrst published in 1887.
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269 technologies, the tape or video recorder) are
270 augmenting in this sense.
271 Enhancing and augmenting ICTs have converged
272 and become bundled together. The Watergate scandal
273 and Nixon’s resignation would have been impossible
274 without them. But whether kept separate or packaged
275 together, old ICTs have always shared the funda-
276 mental feature of facilitating the information ﬂow in
277 the infosphere by increasingly empowering the agents
278 embedded in it. This ‘‘agent-oriented’’ trend in old,
279 predigital9 ICTs is well represented by dystopian
280 views of informationally omnipotent agents, able to
281 overcome any ontological friction, to control every
282 aspect of the information ﬂow, to acquire any per-
283 sonal data and hence to implement the ultimate sur-
284 veillance system, thus destroying all informational
285 privacy, ‘‘the dearest of our possessions’’.
286 Now, according to a ‘‘continuist’’ interpretation of
287 technological changes, digital ICTs should be treated
288 as just one more instance of well-known, enhancing
289 or augmenting ICTs. But then – the reasoning goes –
290 if there is no radical diﬀerence between old and new
291 (i.e. digital) ICTs, it is reasonable to argue that the
292 latter cause increasing problems for informational
293 privacy merely because they are orders of magnitude
294 more powerful than past technologies in enhancing or
295 augmenting agents in the infosphere. All past ICTs
296 have tended to reduce the ontological friction in the
297 infosphere by enhancing or augmenting the agents
298 inhabiting it, but digital ICTs are no exception, so the
299 2P2Q explanation is correct. Orwell’s ‘‘Big Brother’’
300 is readily associated with the ultimate database.
301 Although the continuist 2P2Q hypothesis is rea-
302 sonable and intuitive, it overlooks the essence of the
303 problem. In theory, ontological friction can both be
304 reduced and increased. We have seen how the emer-
305 gence of the urban environment actually produced
306 more anonymity, and hence more ontological friction
307 and more informational privacy. The diﬀerence
308 between old and new ICTs is that the former tended
309 to reduce informational privacy, whereas the latter
310 can also increase it. This is because the former tended
311 to enhance or augment the agents involved more and
312 more, whereas the latter can also change the very
313 nature of the infosphere (that is, of the environment
314 itself, of the agents embedded in it and of their
315 interactions). The 2P2Q explanation misses a funda-
316 mental diﬀerence between old and new ICTs: the
317 former are enhancing or augmenting whereas the
318 latter are best understood as re-ontologizing tech-
319 nologies, an important distinction that needs to be
320 analyzed in some detail.
321Digital ICTs as re-ontologizing technologies
322Our model and a bit of science ﬁction will help to
323introduce the new concept of re-ontologization.10
324Suppose that all the walls and the furniture in our
325students’ house are transformed into perfectly trans-
326parent glass. Assuming our students have good sight,
327this will drastically reduce the ontological friction in
328the system. Imagine next that the students are
329transformed into proﬁcient mind-readers and telep-
330athists. Any informational privacy in this sort of
331Bentham’s PanOpticon will become virtually impos-
332sible. The thought experiment illustrates how radical
333modiﬁcations in the very nature (a re-ontologization)
334of the infosphere can dramatically change the con-
335ditions of possibility of informational privacy.
336The inﬂuence exercised by the new digital ICTs on
337the infosphere can now be analyzed in terms of its re-
338ontologization. Schematically, one can distinguish
339ﬁve fundamental trends.
3401. The digitization of the informational environment.
341This is the most obvious way in which the new ICTs
342have re-ontologized the infosphere. The transition
343from analogue to digital data is very familiar and
344requires no explanation, but perhaps a brief comment
345may not go amiss. In their second study on infor-
346mation storage and ﬂows, Lyman and Varian (2003)
347write that ‘‘Print, ﬁlm, magnetic, and optical storage
348media produced about 5 exabytes of new information
349in 2002. Ninety-two percent of the new information
350was stored on magnetic media, mostly in hard disks.
351[...] Five exabytes of information is equivalent in size
352to the information contained in 37,000 new libraries
353the size of the Library of Congress book collections’’
354(Lyman and Varian, 2003). Although the production
355of analogue data is still increasing, the infosphere is
356fast becoming progressively more digital.
3572. The homogenization of the processor and the
358processed. The re-ontologization of the infosphere
359has also been caused by the fundamental convergence
360between digital resources and digital tools. The
361ontology of the information technologies available
362(e.g. software, databases, communication protocols
363etc.) is now the same as (and hence fully compatible
364with) the ontology of their objects. This was one of
365Turing’s most consequential intuitions: in the re-
366ontologized infosphere, there is no longer any sub-
367stantial diﬀerence between the processor and the
368processed and the digital deals eﬀortlessly and
369seamlessly with the digital. This potentially eliminates
370one of the most long-standing bottlenecks in the
371infosphere, a major source of ontological friction.
9 Orwell’s 1984, ﬁrst published in 1949, contains no reference to
computers or digital machines.
10 The neologism is constructed following the word ‘‘re-
engineering’’ (‘‘to design and construct anew’’).
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372 The increasing computerization of artefacts (from the
373 cash machine to the fridge, from the car to
374 the building, from one’s underwear to a book, cf. the
375 current debate on privacy and RFID11 and of whole
376 social environments (the phenomenon of ‘‘Ubiqui-
377 tous Computing’’ or ‘‘Ambient Intelligence’’12)
378 reminds us that soon it will be diﬃcult to understand
379 what life was in predigital times.
380 3. The evolution of new informational agents. This
381 change concerns the emergence of artiﬁcial and
382 hybrid agents (i.e. partly artiﬁcial and partly human;
383 consider the group of our students as a single agent,
384 equipped with digital cameras, laptops, palm pilots,
385 mobiles, a wireless network, digital TVs, DVDs, CD
386 players, etc.). These new artiﬁcial agents share the
387 same ontology with their environment and can
388 operate in it with much more freedom and control.
389 This is where digital ICTs can be mistaken for mere
390 augmenting technologies. Arguably, the infosphere
391 will be progressively populated by artiﬁcial or hybrid
392 agents, to which other (not necessarily human) agents
393 will be able to delegate tasks and decisions. It is to be
394 expected that the moral status of such agents will
395 become an ever more challenging issue.13
396 4. The informationalization of interactions. In the
397 re-ontologized infosphere populated by ontologically-
398 equal entities and agents, where there is no ontological
399 diﬀerence between processors and processed, inter-
400 actions become equally digital. They are all inter-
401 pretable as ‘‘read/write’’ (i.e., access/alter) activities,
402 with ‘‘execute’’ the remaining type of process.
403 5. The mutation of old agents into informational
404 agents. Finally, by re-ontologizing the infosphere,
405 digital ICTs have also brought to light the intrinsi-
406 cally informational nature of human agents. This is
407 not equivalent to saying that our students in the
408 house have digital alter egos, some Messrs Hydes
409 represented by their @s, blogs and https. This trivial
410 point only encourages us to mistake digital ICTs for
411 merely enhancing technologies. The informational
412 nature of agents should not be confused with a ‘‘data
413 shadow’’14 either. The more radical change, brought
414 about by the re-ontologization of the infosphere, has
415 been the disclosure of human agents as informational
416entities among other informational entities, in the
417following sense.
418Recall the distinction between enhancing and
419augmenting appliances. The switches and dials of the
420former are interfaces meant to plug in the appliance
421to the user’s body ergonomically. The data and
422control panels of augmenting appliances are instead
423interfaces between diﬀerent possible worlds: on the
424one hand there is the human user’s Umwelt,15 and on
425the other hand there are the dynamic, watery, soapy,
426hot and dark world of the dishwasher; the equally
427watery, soapy, hot and dark but also spinning world
428of the washing machine; or the still, aseptic, soapless,
429cold and potentially luminous world of the refriger-
430ator. These robots can be successful because they
431have their environments ‘‘wrapped’’ and tailored
432around their capacities, not vice versa. Imagine our
433students trying to build a droid like C3PO capable of
434washing their dishes in the sink exactly in the same
435way as they would.
436Computers and digital ICTs are not augmenting or
437empowering in the sense just explained. They are
438ontologizing devices because they engineer environ-
439ments that the user is then enabled to enter through
440(possibly friendly) gateways. So, whilst a dishwasher
441interface is a panel through which the machine enters
442into the user’s world, a computer interface is a gate
443through which a user can be telepresent in the info-
444sphere (Floridi, forthcoming-b). This simple but
445fundamental diﬀerence underlies the many spatial
446metaphors of ‘‘cyberspace’’, ‘‘virtual reality’’, ‘‘being
447online’’, ‘‘surﬁng the web’’, ‘‘gateway’’ and so forth.
448The re-ontologization of the infosphere, just sket-
449ched, has been causing an epochal, unprecedented
450migration of humanity from its Umwelt to the info-
451sphere itself. Inside it, humans are informational
452agents among other informational (possibly artiﬁcial)
453agents. They operate in an environment that is
454friendlier to ‘‘digital creatures’’. They have the
455ontological status of informational entities. And as
456digital immigrants are replaced by digital natives, the
457latter may come to appreciate that there is no onto-
458logical diﬀerence between infosphere and Umwelt,
459only a diﬀerence of levels of abstractions (Floridi and
460Sanders, 2004a; forthcoming).
461Informational privacy in the re-ontologized
462infosphere
463To summarize, so far it has been argued that infor-
464mational privacy is a function of the ontological
465friction in the infosphere. Many factors can aﬀect the
11 Radio Frequency IDentiﬁcation, a method of storing and
remotely retrieving data using tags or transponders.
12 Coroama et al. (2004), Bohn et al. (2004) and Brey (2005)
oﬀer an ethical evaluation of privacy-related issues in Ambient
Intelligence environments. For a technically informative and bal-
anced assessment see also Gow (2005).
13 The issue of artiﬁcial morality is analyzed in Floridi and
Sanders (2004b).
14 The term is introduced by Westin (1968) to describe a digital
proﬁle generated from data concerning a user’s habits online. 15 The outer world, or reality, as it aﬀects the agent inhabiting it.
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466 latter, including, most importantly, technological
467 innovations and social developments. Old ICTs
468 aﬀected the ontological friction in the infosphere
469 mainly by enhancing or augmenting the agents
470 embedded into it; therefore, they tended to decrease
471 the degree of informational privacy possible within
472 the infosphere. On the contrary, digital ICTs
473 aﬀect the ontological friction in the infosphere most
474 signiﬁcantly by re-ontologizing it; therefore, not only
475 can they both decrease and protect informational
476 privacy but, most importantly, they can also alter its
477 nature and hence our understanding and appreciation
478 of it.
479 Framing the revolutionary nature of digital ICTs
480 in this ontological way oﬀers several advantages. The
481 ﬁrst can be highlighted immediately: the ontological
482 hypothesis is perfectly consistent with the 2P2Q
483 hypothesis, since the re-ontologization of the info-
484 sphere explains why digital ICTs are so successful, in
485 terms of the quantity, quality and speed at which they
486 can variously process their data. It follows that the
487 ontological hypothesis can inherit whatever explan-
488 atory beneﬁts are carried by the 2P2Q hypothesis.
489 Four other advantages can be listed here but each
490 of them requires a more detailed analysis: (1) con-
491 trary to the 2P2Q hypothesis, the new approach
492 explains why digital ICTs can also enhance infor-
493 mational privacy, although (2) there is still a sense in
494 which the information society provides less protec-
495 tion for informational privacy than the industrial
496 society did. Above all, (3) the ontological hypothesis
497 provides the right frame within which to assess con-
498 temporary interpretations of informational privacy
499 and (4) can indicate how we might wish to proceed in
500 the future in order to protect informational privacy in
501 the newly re-ontologized infosphere. Let us consider
502 each point in turn.
503 Empowering the informational agent
504 In the re-ontologized infosphere, any informational
505 agent has an increased power not only to gather and
506 process personal data, but also to control and protect
507 them. Recall that the digital now deals with the dig-
508 ital eﬀortlessly. The phenomenon cuts both ways. It
509 has led not only to a huge expansion in the ﬂow of
510 personal information being recorded, processed and
511 exploited, but also to a large increase in the types and
512 levels of control that agents can exercise on their
513 personal data. And while there is only a certain
514 amount of personal data that an agent may care to
515 protect, the potential growth of digital means and
516 measures to control their life-cycle does not seem to
517 have a foreseeable limit. If privacy is the right of
518individuals (being these single persons, groups, or
519institutions) to control the life-cycle (especially the
520generation, access, recording and usage) of their
521information and determine for themselves when,
522how, and to what extent their information is pro-
523cessed by others, then one must agree that digital
524ICTs may enhance as well as hinder the possibility of
525enforcing such right.
526At their point of generation, digital ICTs can
527foster the protection of personal data, e.g. by means
528of encryption, anonymization, password-encoding,
529ﬁrewalling, speciﬁcally devised protocols or services,
530and, in the case of externally captured data, warning
531systems.
532At their point of storage, legislation, such as the
533Data Protection Directive passed by the EU in 1995,
534guarantees that no ontological friction, already
535removed by digital ICTs, is surreptitiously reintro-
536duced to prevent agents from coming to know about
537the existence of personal data records, and from
538accessing them, checking their accuracy, correcting or
539upgrading them or demanding their erasure.
540And at their point of exploitation – especially
541through data-mining, -sharing, -matching and
542-merging – digital ICTs could help agents to control
543and regulate the usage of their data by facilitating the
544identiﬁcation and regulation of the relevant users
545involved.
546At each of these three stages, solutions to the
547problem of protecting informational privacy can be
548not only self-regulatory and legislative but also
549technological, not least because informational pri-
550vacy infringements can more easily be identiﬁed and
551redressed also thanks to digital ICTs.
552All this is not to say that we are inevitably moving
553towards an idyllic scenario in which our PETs (Pri-
554vacy Enhancing Technologies) will fully protect our
555private lives and information against harmful PITs
556(Privacy Intruding Technologies). Such optimism is
557unjustiﬁed. But it does mean that digital ICTs can
558already provide some means to counterbalance the
559risks and challenges that they represent for informa-
560tional privacy, and hence that no fatalistic pessimism
561is justiﬁed either. Digital ICTs do not necessarily
562erode informational privacy; they can also enhance
563and protect it. A good example is provided by the
564P3P (Platform for Privacy Preferences) initiative of
565the W3C (World Wide Web Consortium, see http://
566www.w3.org/P3P/).
567The return of the (digital) community
568Because digital ICTs are radically modifying our
569informational environments, ourselves and our
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570 interactions, it would be naı¨ve to expect that infor-
571 mational privacy in the future will mean exactly what
572 it meant in the industrial Western world in the middle
573 of the last century.
574 In section four, we saw that, between the end of
575 the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth
576 century, the ontological friction in the infosphere,
577 actually reduced by old ICTs, was nevertheless
578 increased by social conditions favouring anonymity
579 and hence a new form of informational privacy. In
580 this respect, the diﬀusion of digital ICTs has ﬁnally
581 brought to completion the process begun with the
582 invention of printing. We are back into the now
583 digital community, where anonymity can no longer
584 be taken for granted, and hence where the decrease in
585 ontological friction caused by old and new ICTs can
586 have all its full-blown eﬀects on informational pri-
587 vacy. In Britain, for example, public places are con-
588 stantly monitored by 1.5 m CCTV systems, with the
589 result that the average citizen is recorded 300 times a
590 day (The Economist, (Jan 23rd 2003). The digital
591 ICTs that allowed terrorists to communicate undis-
592 turbed over the Internet were also responsible for the
593 identiﬁcation of the London bombers in a matter of
594 hours (Figure 1). Likewise, mobile phones are
595 increasingly useful as forensic evidence in trials. In
596 Britain, cell site analysis (a form of triangulation that
597 estimates the location of a mobile phone when it is
598 used) helped disprove Ian Huntley’s alibi and convict
599 him for the murdering of Holly Wells and Jessica
600Chapman. Sherlock Holmes has the means to ﬁght
601Mr. Hyde.
602How serious and dangerous is it to live in a glassy
603infosphere? Human agents tend to be acquainted with
604diﬀerent environments that have varying degrees of
605ontological friction and hence to be rather good at
606adapting themselves accordingly. As with other forms
607of ﬁne equilibria, it is hard to identify, for all agents
608in any environments, a common, lowest threshold of
609ontological friction below which human life becomes
610increasingly unpleasant and ultimately unbearable. It
611is clear, however, that a particular threshold has been
612overcome when the agents are willing to employ
613resources, run risks or expend energy to restore it, e.g.
614by building a higher fence, by renouncing a desired
615service, or by investing time in revising a customer
616proﬁle. On the other hand, diﬀerent agents have
617diﬀerent degrees of sensitivity. One needs to remem-
618ber that several factors (character, culture, upbring-
619ing, past experiences etc.) make each agent a unique
620individual. To one person, a neighbour capable of
621seeing one’s garbage in the garden may seem an
622unbearable breach of their privacy, which it is worth
623any expenditure and eﬀort to restore; to another
624person, living in the same room with several other
625family members may feel entirely unproblematic.
626Human agents can adapt to very low levels of onto-
627logical friction. Virginia Woolf’s essay on Montaigne
628discusses the lack of ontological friction that char-
629acterizes public ﬁgures in public contexts. Politicians
Figure 1. CCTV image of the four London terrorists as they set out from Luton.
ONTOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF INFORMATIONAL PRIVACY 7
Journal : ETIN Dispatch : 2-2-2006 Pages : 16
CMS No. : DO00026817
h LE h TYPESET
MS Code : ETIN0001 h CP h DISK4 4
U
N
CO
R
R
EC
TE
D
PR
O
O
F
630 and actors are used to environments were privacy is a
631 rare commodity. Likewise, people involved in ‘‘Big
632 Brother’’ (but ‘‘Truman Show’’ would be a more
633 appropriate label) programmes show a remarkable
634 capacity to adapt to settings where any ontological
635 friction between them and the public is systematically
636 reduced, apparently for the sake of entertainment. In
637 far more tragic and realistic contexts, prisoners in
638 concentration camps are subject to extreme duress
639 due to both intended and unavoidable rarefaction of
640 ontological friction (Levi, 1959).
641 The information society has revised the threshold
642 of ontological friction and therefore provides a dif-
643 ferent sense in which its citizens appreciate their
644 informational privacy. Your supermarket knows
645 exactly what you like, but so did the owner of the
646 grocery where your grandparents used to shop. Your
647 bank has detailed records of all your visits and of
648 your ﬁnancial situation, but how exactly is this dif-
649 ferent from the old service? A phone company could
650 analyze and transform the call data collected for
651 billing purposes into a detailed subscriber proﬁle:
652 social network (names and addresses of colleagues
653 friends or relatives called), possible nationality (types
654 of international calls), times when one is likely to be
655 at home and hence working patterns, ﬁnancial proﬁle
656 (expenditure) and so forth. Put together the data
657 from the supermarket, the bank and the phone
658 company, and inferences of all sorts could be drawn
659 for one’s credit rating. Yet so they could be and were
660 in Alexandre Dumas’ The Count of Monte Cristo
661 (1844). Some steps forward into the information
662 society are really steps back into a small community
663 and, admittedly, the claustrophobic atmosphere that
664 may characterize it.
665 In the early stages in the history of the Web,
666 roughly when Netscape was synonymous with
667 browser, users believed that being online meant being
668 entirely anonymous. A networked computer was like
669 Gyges’ ring in Plato’s Republic (359b–360d): it made
670 one invisible, unaccountable and therefore potentially
671 less responsible, socially speaking. Turing would
672 certainly have appreciated the (at the time) popular
673 comic strip in which a dog, typing an email on a
674 computer, confessed to another dog that ‘‘when you
675 are on the Internet nobody can guess who you are’’.
676 Nowadays, the strip is not funny anymore, only
677 outdated. Cookies, monitoring software and malware
678 (malicious software, such as spyware) have made
679 people realize that the screen in front of them is not a
680 shield for their privacy or Harry Potter’s invisibility
681 cloth, but a window on their lives online, through
682 which virtually anything could be seen. They expect
683 web sites to monitor and record their activities and do
684 not even mind for what purpose. They accept that
685being online is one of the less private things in life.16
686The screen is a monitor and is monitoring you.
687A few years ago, a journalist at The Economist ran
688an experiment (The Economist, December 16th 1999).
689He asked a private investigator, ‘‘Sam’’, to show what
690information it was possible to gather about someone.
691The journalist himself was to be the subject of the
692experiment. The country was Britain, the place where
693the journalist lived. The journalist provided Sam with
694only his ﬁrst and last names. Sam was told not to use
695‘‘any real skulduggery (surveillance, going through
696her domestic rubbish, phone-tapping, hacking, that
697sort of thing)’’. The conclusion? By using several
698databases and various ICTs, ‘‘Without even talking to
699anyone who knows me, Sam [...] had found out quite
700a bit about me. He had a reasonable idea of my per-
701sonal ﬁnances – the value of my house, my salary and
702the amount outstanding on my mortgage. He knew
703my address, my phone number, my partner’s name, a
704former partner’s name, my mother’s name and
705address, and the names of three other people who had
706lived in my house. He had ‘found’ my employer. He
707also had the names and addresses of four people who
708had been directors of a company with me. He knew
709my neighbours’ names.’’
710Shocking? Yes, in the anonymous industrial soci-
711ety, but not really in the pre-industrial village before
712it, or in the information society after it. In Guarcino,
713a small village south of Rome of roughly a thousand
714people, everybody knows everything about every-
715body else, ‘‘vita, morte e miracoli’’, ‘‘life, death and
716miracles’’, as they say in Italian. There is very little
717ontological friction provided by anonymity so there is
718very little informational privacy in that respect. A
719diﬀerence with the information society is that we have
720seen that the latter has the digital means to protect
721what the small village must necessarily forfeit.
722There are of course many other dissimilarities. As
723Paul Oldﬁeld has rightly stressed,17 the comparison
724between today’s information society and the small
725community of the past, where ‘‘everybody knows
726everything’’, must be taken with more than a pinch
727of salt. History may repeat itself, yet never too
16 ‘‘The best long-term assessment of public attitudes toward
privacy is provided by Columbia’s Alan Westin, who has con-
ducted a series of polls over the last thirty years on this issue. On
average, he ﬁnds that one quarter of the American public cares
deeply about keeping personal information secret, one quarter
doesn’t care much at all, and roughly half are in the middle,
wanting to know more about the beneﬁts, safeguards, and risks
before providing information. Customer behaviour in the market-
place – where many people freely provide personal information in
exchange for various oﬀers and beneﬁts – seems to bear out this
conclusion’’ Walker (2000).
17 Private communication. The rest of this section is largely
based on comments sent to me by Paul Oldﬁeld.
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728 monotonously. Small communities had a high degree
729 of intra-community transparency (like a shared
730 house) but a low degree of inter-community trans-
731 parency (they were not like the Big Brother house,
732 visible to outside viewers). So in those communities,
733 the breaches of privacy were reciprocal, yet there were
734 few breaches of privacy across the boundary of the
735 community. This is quite diﬀerent from today’s
736 information society, where there can be very little
737 transparency within the communities we live or work
738 in (we hardly know our neighbours, and our fellow-
739 workers have their privacy rigorously protected), yet
740 data-miners, hackers and institutions can be very well
741 informed about us. Breaches of privacy from outside
742 are common. What is more, we do not even know
743 whether they know our business. On the other hand,
744 part of the value of this comparison lies in the size of
745 the community taken into consideration. A special
746 trait of the information society is precisely its lack of
747 boundaries, its global nature. We live in a single inf-
748 osphere, which has no ‘‘outside’’ and where intra- and
749 inter-community relations are more diﬃcult to dis-
750 tinguish. The types of invasion of privacy are quite
751 diﬀerent too. In the small community, breaches of
752 privacy might shame or discredit you. Interestingly,
753 Augustine usually speaks of privacy in relation to the
754 topic of intercourse in married couples, and he always
755 associates it to secrecy and secrecy to shame or
756 embarrassment. Or they might disclose your real
757 identity or character (more on this in section ten).
758 Things that were private became public knowledge. In
759 the information society, such breaches involve unau-
760 thorized collection of information, not necessarily its
761 publication. Things that are private may not become
762 public at all; they may be just accessed and used by
763 privileged others. The small community also had its
764 own self-regulations for limiting breaches of privacy.
765 Everyone knew that they were as subject to scrutiny as
766 everyone else, and this set an unspoken limit on their
767 enthusiasm for intruding into others’ aﬀairs.
768 Assessing theories of privacy
769 Once it is acknowledged that digital ICTs have
770 re-ontologized the infosphere, it becomes easier to
771 assess the available theories of informational privacy
772 and its moral value.
773 Two theories are particularly popular: the reduc-
774 tionist inteprretation and the ownership-based
775 interpretation.
776 The reductionist interpretation argues that the
777 value of informational privacy rests on a variety of
778 undesirable consequences that may be caused by its
779 breach, either personally (e.g. distress) or socially
780(e.g. unfairness). Informational privacy is a utility,
781also in the sense of providing an essential condition of
782possibility of good human interactions, e.g. by pre-
783serving human dignity or by providing political
784checks and balances.
785The ownership-based interpretation argues that
786informational privacy needs to be respected because of
787each person’s rights to bodily security and property
788(where ‘‘property of x’’ is classically understood as the
789right to exclusive use of x). A person is said to own his
790or her information (information about him- or herself)
791– recall Virginia Woolf’s ‘‘inﬁnitely the dearest of our
792possessions’’ – and therefore to be entitled to control
793its whole life-cycle, from generation to erasure.18
794The two approaches are not incompatible, but
795they stress diﬀerent aspects of informational privacy.
796One is more oriented towards a consequentialist
797assessment of privacy protection or violation. The
798other is more oriented towards a ‘‘natural rights’’
799understanding of the concept of privacy itself, in
800terms of private or intellectual property. Unsurpris-
801ingly, they both compare privacy breach to a tres-
802pass19 or unauthorized invasion of, or intrusion in, a
803space or sphere of personal information, whose
804accessibility and usage ought to be fully controlled by
805its owner and hence kept private. A typical example is
806provided by the border-crossing model of informa-
807tional privacy developed by Gary T. Marx since the
808late nineties (see now Marx, 2005).
809The reductionist interpretation is not entirely sat-
810isfactory. Defending the need for respect for infor-
811mational privacy in view of the potential misuse of
812the information acquired is certainly reasonable,
813especially from a consequentialist perspective, but it
814may be inconsistent with pursuing and furthering
815social interests and welfare. For, although it is obvi-
816ous that even some public personal information may
817need to be protected – e.g. against proﬁling or unre-
818strained electronic surveillance – it remains unclear,
819on a purely reductionist basis, whether a society
820devoid of any informational privacy may not be a
821better society, with a higher, common welfare.20 It
18 The debate on the ownership-based interpretation developed
in the seventies, see Scanlon (1975) and Rachels (1975), who crit-
icize Thomson (1975), who supported an interpretation of the right
to privacy as being based on property rights.
19 See Spinello (2005) for a recent assessment of the use of the
trespassing analogy in computer-ethical and legal contexts. Charles
Ess has pointed out to me that comparative studies have shown
such spatial metaphors to be popular only in Western contexts.
20 Moor (1997) infers from this that informational privacy is not
a core value, i.e. a value that ‘‘all normal humans and cultures need
for survival’’, but then other values he lists as ‘‘core’’ are not really
so in his sense, e.g. happiness and freedom. According to Moor,
privacy is also intrinsically valuable, while being the expression of
the core value represented by security.
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822 has been argued, for example, that the defence of
823 informational privacy in the home may actually be
824 used as a subterfuge to hide the dark side of privacy:
825 domestic abuse, neglect or mistreatment. Precisely
826 because of reductionist-only considerations, even in
827 democratic societies such as the UK and the US, it
828 tends to be acknowledged that the right to informa-
829 tional privacy can be overridden when other concerns
830 and priorities, including business needs, public safety
831 and national security, become more pressing. All this
832 is despite the fact that article 12 of The Universal
833 Declaration of Human Rights clearly indicates that
834 ‘‘No one shall be subjected to arbitrary interference
835 with his privacy, family, home or correspondence,
836 nor to attacks upon his honour and reputation.
837 Everyone has the right to the protection of the law
838 against such interference or attacks.’’
839 The ownership-based interpretation also falls short
840 of being entirely satisfactory. Three problems are
841 worth highlighting here:
842 (i) the issue of informational contamination under-
843 mining passive informational privacy; this is the
844 unwilling acquisition of information or data (e.g.
845 mere noise) imposed on someone by some external
846 source. Brainwashing may not occur often, but
847 junkmail, or the case of a person chatting loudly
848 on a mobile near us, are unfortunately very com-
849 mon experiences of passive privacy breach, yet no
850 informational ownership seems to be violated;
851 (ii) the issue of informational privacy in public con-
852 texts; informational privacy is often exercised in
853 public spaces, that is, in spaces which are not only
854 socially and physically public – a street, a car
855 park, a pub – but also informationally public –
856 anyone can see the newspaper one buys, the bus
857 one takes, the T-shirt one wears, the drink one is
858 ordering (Patton, 2000). How could a CCTV
859 system be a breach of someone’s privacy if the
860 agent is accessing a space which is public in all
861 possible senses anyway? and
862 (iii) the metaphorical and imprecise use of the concept
863 of ‘‘information ownership’’, which cannot quite
864 explain the lossless acquisition (or usage) of
865 information: contrary to other things that one
866 owns, one’s personal information is not lost when
867 acquired by someone else. Analyses of privacy
868 based on ‘‘ownership’’ of an ‘‘informational
869 space’’ are metaphorical twice over.
870 The ontological interpretation of informational
871 privacy and its value
872 Both the reductionist and the ownership-based
873 interpretation fail to acknowledge the radical change
874brought about by digital ICTs. They belong to an
875industrial culture of material goods and of manu-
876facturing/trading relations. They are overstretched
877when trying to cope with the new challenges oﬀered
878by an informational culture of services and usability.
879Warren and Brandeis (1890) had already realized
880this limit very insightfully: ‘‘where the value of the
881production [of some information] is found not in the
882right to take the proﬁts arising from publication, but
883in the peace of mind or the relief aﬀorded by the
884ability to prevent any publication at all, it is diﬃcult
885to regard the right as one of property, in the common
886acceptation of the term’’ (p. 25, emphasis added).
887More than a century later, in the same way as the
888digital revolution is best understood as a fundamental
889re-ontologization of the infosphere, informational
890privacy requires an equally radical re-interpretation,
891one that takes into account the essentially informa-
892tional nature of human beings and of their operations
893as informational social agents.
894Such re-interpretation is achieved by considering
895each person as constituted by his or her information,
896and hence by understanding a breach of one’s infor-
897mational privacy as a form of aggression towards
898one’s personal identity.
899The following passage by Marcel Proust, though
900admittedly referring to the social construction of the
901individual, helps to conveys the idea of a person as an
902informational entity: ‘‘But then, even in the most
903insigniﬁcant details of our daily life, none of us can be
904said to constitute a material whole, which is identical
905for everyone, and need only be turned up like a page
906in an account-book or the record of a will; our social
907personality is created by the thoughts of other people.
908Even the simple act which we describe as ‘‘seeing
909some one we know’’ is, to some extent, an intellectual
910process. We pack the physical outline of the creature
911we see with all the ideas we have already formed
912about him, and in the complete picture of him which
913we compose in our minds those ideas have certainly
914the principal place. In the end they come to ﬁll out so
915completely the curve of his checks, to follow so
916exactly the line of his nose, they blend so harmoni-
917ously in the sound of his voice that these seem to be
918no more than a transparent envelope, so that each
919time we see the face or hear the voice it is our own
920ideas of him which we recognize and to which we
921listen.’’ (Remembrance of Things Past – Swann’s
922Way).
923The ontological interpretation is consistent with
924the fact that digital ICTs can both erode and rein-
925force informational privacy, and hence that a positive
926eﬀort needs to be made in order to support not only
927PET but also ‘‘poietic’’ (i.e. constructive) applica-
928tions, which may allow users to design, shape and
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929 maintain their identities as informational agents
930 (Floridi and Sanders, 2005). The information ﬂow
931 needs some friction in order to keep ﬁrm the dis-
932 tinction between the multiagent system (the society)
933 and the identity of the agents (the individuals) con-
934 stituting it. Any society (even a utopian one) in which
935 no informational privacy is possible is one in which
936 no personal identity can be maintained and hence no
937 welfare can be achieved, social welfare being only the
938 sum of the individuals’ involved. The total ‘‘trans-
939 parency’’ of the infosphere that may be advocated by
940 some reductionists – recall the example of the glassy
941 house and of our mentally super-enhanced students –
942 achieves the protection of society only by erasing all
943 personal identity and individuality, a ‘‘ﬁnal solution’’
944 for sure, but hardly one that the individuals them-
945 selves, constituting the society so protected, would be
946 happy to embrace freely.
947 The advantage of the ontological interpretation
948 over the reductionist one is then that consequentialist
949 concerns may override respect for informational
950 privacy, whereas the ontological interpretation, by
951 equating its protection to the protection of personal
952 identity, considers it a fundamental and inalienable
953 right,21 so that, by default, the presumption should
954 always be in favour of its respect. As we shall see, this
955 is not to say that informational privacy is never
956 negotiable in any degree.
957 Looking at the nature of a person as being con-
958 stituted by that person’s information allows one to
959 understand the right to informational privacy as a
960 right to personal immunity from unknown, undesired
961 or unintentional changes in one’s own identity as an
962 informational entity, either actively – collecting,
963 storing, reproducing, manipulating etc. one’s infor-
964 mation amounts now to stages in cloning and
965 breeding someone’s personal identity – or passively –
966 as breaching one’s informational privacy may now
967 consist in forcing someone to acquire unwanted data,
968 thus altering her or his nature as an informational
969 entity without consent.22 The ﬁrst diﬃculty facing the
970 ownership-based interpretation is thus avoided: in
971 either case, the ontological interpretation suggests
972 that there is no diﬀerence between one’s informa-
973 tional sphere and one’s personal identity. ‘‘You are
974 your information’’, so anything done to your infor-
975 mation is done to you, not to your belongings. The
976 right to informational privacy (both in the active and
977 in the passive sense just seen) shields one’s personal
978 identity. This is why informational privacy is extre-
979 mely valuable and ought to be respected.
980Heuristically, violations of informational privacy
981are now more fruitfully compared to a digital kid-
982napping rather than trespassing: the observed is
983moved to an observer’s local space of observation (a
984space which is remote for the observed), unwillingly
985and possibly unknowingly. What is abducted is per-
986sonal information and no actual removal is in ques-
987tion, but a cloning of the relevant piece of personal
988information. Yet the cloned information is not a
989‘‘space’’ that belongs to the observed and which has
990been trespassed; it is part of the observed herself, or
991better something that (at least partly) constitutes the
992observed for what she or he is. It is a Doppelga¨nger,
993as Richard Avedon described it once, when speaking
994of his photograph of Henry Kissinger (‘‘Is it just a
995shadow representation of a man? Or is it closer to a
996doppelga¨nger, a likeness with its own life, an inexact
997twin whose afterlife may overcome and replace the
998original?’’). A further advantage, in this change of
999perspective, is that it becomes possible to dispose of
1000the false dichotomy qualifying informational privacy
1001in public or in private contexts. Insofar as a piece of
1002information constitutes an agent, it does so context-
1003independently and that is why the observed may wish
1004to preserve her integrity and uniqueness as an infor-
1005mational entity, even when she is in an entirely public
1006place. After all, trespassing makes no sense in a
1007public space, but kidnapping is a crime independently
1008of where it is committed. The second problem
1009aﬀecting the ownership-based interpretation is also
1010solved.
1011As for the third problem, one may still argue that
1012an agent ‘‘owns’’ his or her information, yet no longer
1013in the metaphorical sense seen above, but in the
1014precise sense in which an agent is her or his infor-
1015mation. ‘‘My’’ in ‘‘my information’’ is not the same
1016‘‘my’’ as in ‘‘my car’’ but rather the same ‘‘my’’ as in
1017‘‘my body’’ or ‘‘my feelings’’: it expresses a sense of
1018constitutive belonging, not of external ownership, a
1019sense in which my body, my feelings and my infor-
1020mation are part of me but are not my (legal) pos-
1021sessions. It is worth quoting Warren and Brandeis
1022(1890) once again: ‘‘‘‘[...] the protection aﬀorded to
1023thoughts, sentiments, and emotions [...] is merely an
1024instance of the enforcement of the more general right
1025of the individual to be let alone. It is like the right not
1026to be assaulted or beaten, the right not to be
1027imprisoned, the right not to be maliciously perse-
1028cuted, the right not to be defamed [or, the right not to
1029be kidnapped, my addition]. In each of these rights
1030[...] there inheres the quality of being owned or pos-
1031sessed and [...] there may be some propriety in
1032speaking of those rights as property. But, obviously,
1033they bear little resemblance to what is ordinarily
1034comprehended under that term. The principle [...] is in
21 For a diﬀerent view see Volkman, 2003.
22 This view is close to the interpretation of privacy in terms of
protection of human dignity defended by Bloustein (1964).
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1035 reality not the principle of private propriety but that of
1036 inviolate personality (p. 31, emphasis added) [...] the
1037 right to privacy, as part of the more general right to the
1038 immunity of the person, [is] the right to one’s person-
1039 ality (p. 33, emphasis added).
1040 This ontological conception has started being
1041 appreciated by more advanced information societies
1042 where identity theft is the fastest growing white-collar
1043 oﬀence, as Figure 2 well indicates. Informational
1044 privacy is the other side of identity theft, to the point
1045 that, ironically, for every person whose identity has
1046 been stolen (around 10m Americans are victims
1047 annually) there is another person (the thief) whose
1048 identity has been ‘‘enhanced’’.
1049 Recent problems aﬀecting Google and its privacy
1050 policy convey a similar picture. As Kevin Bankston,
1051 staﬀ attorney at the Electronic Frontier Foundation,
1052 remarks ‘‘Your search history shows your associa-
1053 tions, beliefs, perhaps your medical problems. The
1054 things you Google for deﬁne you. [...] data that’s
1055 practically a printout of what’s going on in your
1056 brain: What you are thinking of buying, who you talk
1057 to, what you talk about’’ (quoted in Mills, 2005,
1058 emphasis added).
1059 As anticipated, the ontological interpretation
1060 reshapes some of the assumptions behind our still
1061 ‘‘industrial’’ conception of informational privacy.
1062 Three examples are indicative of this transition.
1063If personal information is ﬁnally acknowledged to
1064be a constitutive part of someone’s personal identity
1065and individuality, then one day it may become strictly
1066illegal to trade in some kinds of personal information,
1067exactly as it is illegal to trade in human organs
1068(including one’s own) or slaves. The problem of child
1069pornography may also be revisited in light of an
1070ontological interpretation of informational privacy.
1071At the same time, one might relax one’s attitude
1072towards some kinds of ‘‘dead personal information’’
1073that, like ‘‘dead pieces of oneself’’, are not really or
1074no longer constitutive of oneself. One should not sell
1075one’s kidney, but can certainly sell one’s hair or be
1076rewarded for giving blood. Recall the experiment of
1077the journalist at The Economist. Very little of what
1078Sam had discovered could be considered ontologi-
1079cally constitutive of the person in question. We are
1080constantly leaving behind a trail of personal data,
1081pretty much in the same sense in which we are losing
1082a huge trail of dead cells. The fact that nowadays
1083digital ICTs allow our data trails to be recorded,
1084monitored, processed and used for social, political or
1085commercial purposes is a strong reminder of our
1086informational nature as individuals and might be seen
1087as a new level of ecologism, as an increase in what is
1088recycled and a decrease in what is wasted.
1089At the moment, all this is just speculation and in
1090the future it will probably be a matter of ﬁne
Figure 2. Identity thefts in the US between 2002 and 2004. Source: Data from Consumer Sentinel and the Identity Theft
Data Clearinghouse, National and State Trends in Fraud & Identity Theft, January–December 2004. Federal Trade
Commission, February 1, 2005.
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1091 adjustments of ethical sensibilities, but the third
1092 Geneva Convention (1949) already provides a clear
1093 test of what might be considered ‘‘dead personal
1094 information’’: a prisoner of war need only give his or
1095 her name, rank, date of birth, and serial number and
1096 no form of coercion may be inﬂicted on him or her to
1097 secure any further information, of any kind. If we
1098 were all considered ‘‘prisoners of the information
1099 society’’, our informational privacy would be well
1100 protected and yet there would still be some personal
1101 data that would be perfectly ﬁne to share with any
1102 other agent, even hostile ones.
1103 A further issue that might be illuminated by the
1104 ontological interpretation is that of conﬁdentiality.
1105 The sharing of private information with someone,
1106 implicitly or explicitly, is based on a relation of pro-
1107 found trust that joins together the agents involved.
1108 This coupling is achieved by allowing the agents to be
1109 partly constituted, ontologically, by the same infor-
1110 mation. Visually, the informational identities of the
1111 agents involved now overlap, at least partially, as in a
1112 Venn diagram. The union of the agents forms a single
1113 unity, a supra-agent. Precisely because entering into a
1114 new supra-agent is a delicate and risky operation,
1115 care should be exercised before ‘‘melding’’ oneself
1116 with other individuals by sharing personal informa-
1117 tion or its source i.e. common experiences. Conﬁ-
1118 dentiality is a bond that is hard and slow to forge
1119 properly, yet resilient to many external forces when
1120 ﬁnally in place, as the supra-agent is stronger than the
1121 constitutive agents themselves. Relatives, friends,
1122 classmates, fellows, colleagues, comrades, compan-
1123 ions, partners, team-mates, spouses and so forth may
1124 all have experienced the nature of such a bond, the
1125 stronger taste of a ‘‘we’’. But it is also a bond very
1126 brittle and diﬃcult to restore when it comes to
1127 betrayal, since the disclosure, deliberate or uninten-
1128 tional, of some personal information in violation of
1129 conﬁdence can entirely and irrecoverably destroy the
1130 privacy of the new, supra-agent born out of the
1131 joining agents, by painfully tearing them apart. We
1132 shall return to the topic of trust and conﬁdentiality at
1133 the end of this article.
1134 A third and ﬁnal issue can be touched upon rather
1135 brieﬂy, as it was already mentioned above: the
1136 ontological interpretation stresses that informational
1137 privacy is also a matter of construction of one’s own
1138 informational identity. The right to be let alone is
1139 also the right to be allowed to experiment with one’s
1140 own life, to start again, without having records that
1141 mummify one’s personal identity forever, taking
1142 away from the individual the power to mould it.
1143 Everyday, a person may wish to build a diﬀerent,
1144 possibly better, ‘‘I’’. We never stop becoming our-
1145 selves, so protecting a person’s informational privacy
1146also means allowing that person the freedom to
1147change, ontologically.23
1148Informational privacy, personal identity and biometrics
1149On September 12, 1560 the young Montaigne atten-
1150ded the public trial of Arnaud du Tilh, an impostor
1151who was sentenced to death for having faked his
1152identity. Many acquaintances and family members,
1153including the wife Bertrande, had been convinced for
1154a long while that he was Martin Guerre, returned
1155home after many years of absence. Only when the
1156real Martin Guerre came home was Arnaud’s actual
1157identity ﬁnally ascertained.
1158Had Martin Guerre always been able to protect his
1159personal information, Arnaud du Tilh would have
1160been unable to steal his identity. Clearly, the more
1161one’s informational privacy is protected themore one’s
1162personal identity can be safeguarded. This new quali-
1163tative equation is a direct consequence of the onto-
1164logical interpretation. Personal identity also depends
1165on informational privacy. The diﬃculty facing our
1166contemporary society is how to combine the new
1167equation with the other equation, introduced in sec-
1168tion three, according to which informational privacy is
1169a function of the ontological friction in the infosphere.
1170Ideally, one would like to reap all the beneﬁts from
1171(a) the highest level of information ﬂow; and hence
1172from
1173(b) the lowest level of ontological friction; while
1174enjoying
1175(c) the highest level of informational privacy pro-
1176tection; and hence
1177(d) the highest level of personal identity protection.
1178The problem is that (a) and (d) seem incompatible:
1179facilitate and increase the information ﬂow through
1180digital ICTs and the protection of one’s personal
1181identity is bound to come under increasing pressure.
1182You cannot have an identity without having an
1183identikit. Or so it seems, until one realizes that the
1184information ﬂowing in (a) consists of all sorts of data,
1185including arbitrary data about oneself (e.g. a name
1186and surname) that are actually shareable, whereas the
1187information required to protect (d) can be ontic data,
1188that is, data constituting someone (e.g. someone’s
1189DNA) that are hardly sharable by nature.24 Enter
1190biometrics.
23 In this sense, Johnson (2001) seems to be right in considering
informational privacy an essential element in an individual’s
autonomy. Moor (1997), referring to a previous edition of Johnson
(2001), disagrees.
24 On the tripartite distinction between information as, about or
for reality see Floridi (2004).
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1191 Personal identity is the weakest link and most
1192 delicate element in our problem. Even nowadays,
1193 personal identity is regularly protected and authen-
1194 ticated by means of some arbitrary data, randomly or
1195 conventionally attached to the bearer/user, like a
1196 mere label: a name, an address, a Social Security
1197 number, a bank account, a credit card number, a
1198 driving licence number, a PIN and so forth. Each
1199 label in the list has no ontologically constitutive link
1200 with its bearer; it is merely associated with some-
1201 one’s identity and can easily be detached from it
1202 without aﬀecting it. The rest is a mere consequence
1203 of this ‘‘detachability’’. The more the ontological
1204 friction in the infosphere decreases, the swifter these
1205 detached labels can ﬂow around, and the easier it
1206 becomes to grab and steal them and use them for
1207 illegal purposes. Arnaud du Tilh had stolen a name
1208 and a proﬁle and succeeded in impersonating Martin
1209 Guerre for many years in a rather small village,
1210 within a community that knew him well, fooling
1211 even Martin’s wife, apparently. Eliminate all per-
1212 sonal interactions and identity theft becomes the
1213 easiest thing in the world.
1214 A quick and dirty way to ﬁx the problem would be
1215 to clog the infosphere by slowing down the infor-
1216 mation ﬂow. Building some traﬃc calming device, as
1217 it were. It seems the sort of policy popular among
1218 some IT oﬃcers and bank managers, keen on not
1219 allowing this or that operation for security reasons,
1220 for example. However, as with all counter-revolu-
1221 tionary or anti-historical approaches, ‘‘resistance is
1222 futile’’: trying to withstand the evolution of the inf-
1223 osphere only harms current users and, in the long
1224 run, fails to deliver an eﬀective solution.
1225 A much better approach is to ensure that the
1226 ontological friction keeps decreasing, thus beneﬁting
1227 all the inhabitants of the infosphere, while safe-
1228 guarding personal identity by data that are not
1229 arbitrary labels about, but rather constitutive traits
1230 of, the person in question. Arnaud du Tilh and
1231 Martin Guerre looked very similar, yet this was as far
1232 as biometrics went in the sixteenth century. Today,
1233 biometric digital ICTs are increasingly used to
1234 authenticate a person’s identity by measuring the
1235 person’s physiological traits – such as ﬁngerprints,
1236 eye retinas and irises, voice patterns, facial patterns,
1237 hand measurements or DNA sampling – or behav-
1238 ioral features, such as typing patterns. Since they also
1239 require the person to be identiﬁed to be physically
1240 present at the point-of-identiﬁcation, biometric sys-
1241 tems provide a very reliable way of ensuring that the
1242 person is who the person claims to be; of course not
1243 always, and not infallibly – after all Montaigne used
1244 the extraordinary case of Martin Guerre to challenge
1245 human attempts ever to reach total certainty – but far
1246more successfully than any arbitrary label can. It is a
1247matter of degree.
1248All this is not to say that we should embrace bio-
1249metrics as an unproblematic panacea. As Alterman
1250(2003) has correctly shown, there are many risks and
1251limits in the use of such technologies as well. But it is
1252signiﬁcant that digital ICTs, in their transformation
1253of the information society into a digital community,
1254are partly restoring, partly improving (see the case of
1255Martin Guerre) that reliance on personal acquain-
1256tance that characterized relations of trust in any small
1257town. By giving away some information, one can
1258safeguard one’s identity and hence one’s informa-
1259tional privacy, while taking advantage of interactions
1260that are personalized (through preferences derived
1261from one’s habits and behaviours) and customized
1262(through preferences derived from one’s expressed
1263choices). In the digital community, you are a recog-
1264nized individual, whose tastes, inclinations, habits,
1265preferences etc. are known to the other agents, who
1266can adapt their behaviour accordingly.
1267As for protecting the privacy of biometric data,
1268again, no rosy picture should be painted, but if one
1269applies the ‘‘Convention of Geneva’’ test, it seems
1270that even the worst enemy could be allowed to
1271authenticate someone’s identity by measuring her
1272ﬁngerprints or his eye retinas. They seem to be per-
1273sonal data that is worth sacriﬁcing in favour of the
1274extra protection they can oﬀer of one’s personal
1275identity and private life.
1276Once a cost/beneﬁt analysis is taken into account,
1277it makes sense to rely on authentication systems that
1278do not lend themselves so easily to misuse. In the
1279digital community, one is one’s own information and
1280can be (biometrically) recognized as oneself as one
1281was in the small village. The case of Martin Guerre is
1282there to remind us that mistakes are still possible. But
1283their likelihood decreases dramatically the more
1284biometric data one is willing to check. On this,
1285Penelope can teach us a ﬁnal lesson.
1286Conclusion
1287When Odysseus returns to Ithaca, he is identiﬁed four
1288times. Argos, his old dog, is not fooled and recognizes
1289him despite his disguise as a beggar. Then Eurycleia,
1290his wet-nurse, while bathing him, recognizes him by a
1291scar on his leg, which he had received from a boar
1292when hunting. He then proves to be the only man
1293capable of stringing Odysseus’ bow. All these are
1294biometric tests no Arnaud du Tilh would have pas-
1295sed. But then, Penelope is no Bertrande either. She
1296does not rely on any ‘‘unique identiﬁer’’ but ﬁnally
1297tests Odysseus by asking Eurycleia to move the bed in
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1298 their wedding-chamber. Odysseus protests that this is
1299 impossible: he himself had built the bed around a
1300 living olive tree, which is now one of its legs. This is a
1301 crucial piece of information that only Penelope and
1302 Odysseus ever shared. By naturally relying on it,
1303 Odysseus restores Penelope’s full trust. She recog-
1304 nizes him as the real Odysseus not because of who he
1305 is or how he looks, but, ontologically, because of the
1306 information that they have in common and that
1307 constitutes both of them as a couple. Through the
1308 sharing of this piece of information identity is
1309 restored and the supra-agent is reunited. There is a
1310 line of continuity between the roots of the olive tree
1311 and the married couple. For Homer, their bond was
1312 homophrosyne (like-mindedness); to Shakespeare, it
1313 was the marriage of true minds. To us, it is infor-
1314 mational privacy that admits no ontological friction.
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